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2 Thinking outward
Heuristics for systemic understanding
of environmental problems
Katri Huutoniemi and Risto Willamo*
1 Introduction
In the face of sustainability challenges, the limits of reductionist thinking are
widely recognized. The rise of modern environmental discourse half a century
ago can be portrayed as a response to the unresolved issues left by reductionist
science. Since then, many environmentalists have systematically challenged
the scientiﬁc tendency to split complex phenomena into simplistic analytical
models and thereby isolate objects from their environment. This ‘paradigm of
simpliﬁcation’ (Morin 2008) is seen as incapable of recognizing the complex-
ity of environmental issues, and it is considered to lead to inappropriate policy
solutions that frequently fail to reach sustainability (e.g Ostrom 2009). A classic
example of this paradigm in environmental management is the widespread
separation between the elements of the ecological environment – water, air and
soil – and their treatment accordingly (e.g. Miller 1996).
During the last decades, holistic approaches to the human–environment
relationship have become institutionalized in academia, including the ﬁelds of
human ecology, ecological anthropology, environmental geography, ecological
economics, and so on. ‘Holism’ encompasses approaches to scientiﬁc inquiry
that investigate complex systems whose behaviour cannot be understood by
studying the individual components of the system in isolation. While reduc-
tionism strives for insight that is independent of the context in time and
space, holism, in contrast, strives for insight that embraces and explains the
context and complexity (Sarewitz 2010). Neither approach, however, provides
analytical tools to understand or deal with complexity as an emergent and
variable property of an open system, resulting from intricate interactions
amongst multiple components which are not necessarily complex in themselves.
These interactions produce the ‘higher-order’ properties which make the system
what it ‘is’, for the time being (Cilliers 2010; Prigogine and Stengers 1984).
Since complex systems cannot be deﬁned conclusively – indeed, there is no
stepping outside complexity – all holistic descriptions of human–environment
interaction are based on a model of this interaction, which necessarily reduces
the complexity of the systems. There is no objective way to do this reduction;
instead, a series of choices behind particular approximations of the whole is
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needed with respect to how to deﬁne the system, what system functions and
outcomes are important, what measures to take to make things better, and
what is considered an improvement (Sarewitz 2010; Ison 2010). A holistic
description developed for one context may not be optimal for another. How-
ever, those who are developing or applying a particular approach are not
usually weighing the choices behind their system deﬁnition against other
possible deﬁnitions. Thus, particular ways to deﬁne systems easily become
reiﬁed so that they are understood as existing independent of our con-
ceptualizations of them. An example is the mainstream position wherein
ecosystems are literally taken as natural units, systems created by nature. The
concept of ecosystem, however, is a speciﬁc way of perceiving a complex set
of interactions in nature. Like all system approximations, conceptions of
ecosystems involve boundary judgements by an observer (Ison 2010, 2011).
In this chapter, we argue that dealing with environmental sustainability
requires a systemic, yet open-ended approach to human–environment inter-
action. Interconnections are a key for such understanding, but it depends on
the perspective and purpose which connections matter and are taken into
account (Ison 2010). Our primary goal in this chapter is to contribute to the
general capacity of transdisciplinary inquiry to capture environmental issues
as emergent and systemic features of human–environment interaction. Instead
of proposing a theoretical account of which interactions matter and in what
way, we focus on the cognitive search process through which relations
between components can be explored. We call this strategy outward-oriented
thinking, as the simple idea is to deﬁne and make sense of an issue by looking
outwards rather than inwards from it, that is, by looking at its relations
to other systems either ‘beside’ or ‘above’ it. Following this operation, the
logic of analyzing the issue may change; the initial objects of interest transform
into diﬀerent entities; and the issue becomes understood in novel ways.
We will illustrate this strategy through three heuristic variations, which aim
at facilitating systemic understanding of environmental problems across con-
texts, while remaining sensitive to the unique nature of each problem situation.
Each heuristic provides an orientation framework for making connections
amongst a range and diversity of factors in order to create a comprehensive
and purposeful understanding of environmental issues. First is a systemic
framework for identifying and categorizing human-induced environmental
changes; second is a process model of what constitutes an environmental
problem; and third is a generic checklist for aspects of environmental issues
that deserve systemic consideration. Before going into the strategy of outward
thinking and its heuristic variations, we make a case for systems thinking
in transdisciplinary environmental and sustainability research.
2 Environmental problems in systemic view
Systemic thinking refers to the understanding of a phenomenon within the
context of a larger whole (e.g. Ison 2010). It is a constitutive aspect of all
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environmental sciences, as their focus on ‘environment’ rests on the assump-
tion that the elements and processes we observe in nature are connected to
each other in ways that deserve integrated consideration. Implications of this
assumption range from the recognition of complex causation in ecological
processes (e.g. Levin 1992) to ethical principles for holistic nature conserva-
tion (e.g. Leopold 1949). However, a higher degree of systemic thinking
came to characterize the problem-centred discussion of environment that
arose in the 1960s. This entailed broader consciousness about the ways in
which human activities are embedded in ecological systems, which, in
turn, are threatened by increasing human inﬂuence. Especially after the
publication of Silent Spring (Carson 1962), our environment as a vulnerable
whole became an issue and an object of public attention and scientiﬁc
research. This image was epitomized by the early pictures of our planet seen
from space.
Along with the rise of broader environmental consciousness, the impor-
tance of a holistic view was recognized. The 1972 report commissioned by the
Club of Rome, Limits to Growth (Meadows et al. 1972), emphasized the
interconnectedness of economic and socio-cultural problems with ecological
ones, and a bestselling book of ecology, The Closing Circle (Commoner 1971),
suggested that the American economy should be restructured to conform to
ecological laws. Another systemic view was the Gaia hypothesis (Lovelock
1979), according to which the Earth was assumed to function analogically to
a living organism. These accounts set the stage for a systemic approach to
environmental issues, which is today often categorized under the rubric of
sustainability science.
In the dominant understanding of sustainability, the global environment is
represented as a set of systems of varying scales and levels of resolution and
complexity (e.g. Kates et al. 2001). The study of social-ecological systems
(Ostrom 2009), for example, observes the use of natural resources by explor-
ing relationships between resource systems, resource units, resource users and
governance systems. For another example, industrial ecology (e.g. Ayres and
Ayres 2002) observes the interaction of industrial systems with the biosphere
by using natural ecosystems as a metaphor for environmental sustainability.
Such frameworks capture environmental problems from a systemic perspec-
tive: problems are not viewed as isolated instances that need to be solved;
instead, they are viewed as relationally constituted by a number of non-linear
interactions and various feedback loops that are the causes and eﬀects of each
other.
However, a diﬀerent set of ontological arguments concerning environ-
mental issues have been made since the 1990s, drawing on a range of intel-
lectual traditions including science and technology studies, social anthropology,
cultural geography, political ecology and poststructuralist theory (e.g. Liverman
1999). They show that the scientiﬁc models of the environment are shaped by
political assumptions and cultural values, and argue for an awareness of the
limitations of scientiﬁc expertise and for the recognition of the importance of
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local and indigenous knowledge of the environment. These studies have raised
fundamental questions concerning the very distinction between the natural
and the social, and oﬀered explanations for how such categories are them-
selves socially produced (e.g. Jasanoﬀ 2004; Latour 2004). According to Barry
and colleagues (2008), the studies of environmental issues as socially con-
structed are in an agonistic or antagonistic relation to environmental science,
as theymake claims that contest or transcend the epistemological and ontological
assumptions made by environmental scientists.
At the same time, the growing poststructural interest in the environment
has brought a new sense of context to environmental issues – that of our
systems of observing and dealing with them. While it clearly does not support
the systemic understanding of environmental problems as environmental sci-
ence has it, the two perspectives can be understood to operate at diﬀerent
logical levels. Whereas environmental sciences investigate the dynamics of
human–environment interaction at a ‘ﬁrst-order’ level of observation, their
critics in the poststructural tradition incorporate a new set of variables into
the analysis, which opens up a new ‘level’ of observing the problematique. In
this sense, the relationship between the two perspectives is not negation, but
self-reference (see Ison and Russell 2000). What appears as critique of the ﬁrst
perspective simply oﬀers a meta-point of view, which integrates the observer
in its observation (Morin 2008: 51). Such a meta-view, however, can itself be
observed from another point of view – the self-referential cycle continuing ad
inﬁnitum.
This kind of layered view of the diﬀerent concerns and claims about envir-
onmental issues illustrates the transdisciplinary potential of the systemic
approach. Its promises to environmental problem solving are somewhat dif-
ferent, or lie elsewhere, than is implied by most ﬁrst-order descriptions of
human–environment systems. First, those systems do not exist in the world
‘out there’, but are brought forth in the process of our observing and acting in
the world (Schlindwein and Ison 2004). This highlights the ability of systemic
inquiry to tackle the conceptual or epistemological complexity of environ-
mental problems and thus ‘avoid the worst excesses of living in a projectiﬁed
and programmatic world’ (Ison 2010: 246). Second, and following from the
ﬁrst point, the way in which a system gets deﬁned is not a passive description
of reality, but an active construction of opportunities for thinking and acting
upon it (see Law 2004).
These insights are in line with the ‘design turn’ in systems thinking, which
changes the focus from the ontological status of systems to their heuristic
functions and technologies for social learning. Conceptualizing a complex set
of interactions as a system is an eﬀective way to bring out diﬀerent approa-
ches, reframe situations and problems, and set out thinking and acting in
purposeful ways (Ison 2010). The Gaia hypothesis and the models of the Club
of Rome, for example, may not be scientiﬁcally rigorous, let alone ‘empirically
testable’, but they oﬀer heuristic constructions that sensitize us on planet-scale
considerations. In general, operating at a systemic level increases the
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likelihood of ﬁnding ‘leverage points’ that enable radical intervention in
problems instead of mere incremental improvement (Meadows 1999).
3 Outward thinking as a tool for systemic understanding
As a strategy for coping with the cognitive or conceptual complexity we
experience in the face of environmental problems, we discuss a simple ‘search
rule’: look outward from the initial object of interest, and attempt systemic
understanding at a new level. We call this strategy ‘outward thinking’, and
propose it as a potential cognitive orientation for dealing with complex phe-
nomena. Because of its simplicity, we suggest that it is helpful in detecting
and correcting common shortages in environmental research, politics, educa-
tion, administration, and so forth, and especially in their ‘inward-looking’
organizational logics that fail to acknowledge and address complexity. Out-
ward thinking can lead to the invention of new categories or rearrangement
of established categories. It is a generic tool for ﬁnding an appropriate fra-
mework that allows one to make claims that matter within a given context or
problem situation.
The operational principle of outward thinking is its active alignment of the
object of interest with other entities either ‘beside’ or ‘above’ it. The latter
attributes refer to logical levels of observation that can only be deﬁned in
relation to a particular system of interest. Any framing of an issue or a pro-
blem makes some alignments, but often they are embedded in a given pro-
blem deﬁnition rather than critically reﬂected. From the perspective of
epistemological complexity, environmental problems can be described and
intervened in a number of diﬀerent ways, all of which entail a particular set of
cognitive alignments. It is thus possible to actively search for alignments that
allow one to frame problems in insightful ways. This is in line with the strat-
egy of deconstruction which investigates the structural conditions for meaning
in any system. Once these conditions have been identiﬁed, it becomes visible
that they could also be diﬀerent, thereby displacing the meaning generated in
the system (Cilliers and Preiser 2010: 291). In order to avoid premature cate-
gorization and reaction to complex problems ahead of us, we need cognitive
tools for organizing that complexity and ﬁnding the most eﬀective entry
points to them.
Outward thinking is based on ideas similar to those behind ‘lateral think-
ing’, developed by Edward de Bono (e.g. 1970). According to de Bono, typi-
cal Western reasoning follows ‘vertical’ logic, in which the object of interest is
narrowed down into a given perspective or phenomenon, and the thinking
proceeds logically from the given object to another. As this hinders new
inventions and insights, he suggests a strategy of consciously re-directing
thinking away from this path and towards more surprising directions. Unlike
de Bono, we do not suggest searching solutions from the most unlikely
direction or to breaking the patterns of logical thinking. Rather, the idea of
outward thinking is to systematically and logically map the world outside a
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given object of interest, or beyond the assumed boundary between the object
and the rest of the world. We then broaden the scope of attention to include
those objects and issues that lie outside the original object of interest, and try
to ﬁnd commonalities of structure and processes despite the appearance of
diﬀerence.
Outward thinking can be seen as the opposite of ‘inward thinking’, of
which the reductionist method of science is the most profound example. It can
be argued that inward thinking has led to a fragmented understanding and
treatment of environmental problems, including the way environmental reg-
ulation is designed and implemented. Even environmental sciences have not
avoided this tendency. Despite their explicit attempt to integrated analyses,
they tend to limit attention to one ‘problem’ at a time, which diverts attention
from the interconnections between them. Some humanities approaches to the
study of environment do not share the scientiﬁc tendency of splitting phe-
nomena but rather aim at a holistic engagement with them (Frodeman,
Chapter 11, this volume). Our strategy of outward thinking has thus less to
oﬀer to those traditions, except for making the contributions of environmental
sciences more accessible or interesting to them, and vice versa.
Overall, diﬀerent approaches oﬀer diﬀerent heuristics for deﬁning problems
and ﬁnding solutions, but the richer our heuristic repertoire is, the higher our
capacity to deal with complex problems is. For example, carbon dioxide
emissions and their consequences can be analyzed by sector or source, but
also as systemic outcomes of life styles or social structures. Combining both
approaches obviously captures more than either one of them. Outward
thinking might serve as a cognitive strategy for shifting across approaches,
and particularly for environmental sciences to move closer to the humanities
without losing sight of the causal accounts provided by the reductionist
method.
3.1 Directions of outward thinking
The practice of outward thinking can be illustrated by making a distinction
between two directions: horizontally ‘sideways’ on the one hand and vertically
‘up’ on the other. The idea is that the inquirer moves from the original point
of observation to another point, which allows him or her to situate the object
of interest in a wider context and re-conceptualize it in relation to other
phenomena in that context.
In horizontally directed thinking, the inquirer searches for comparable
entities with a view to identifying commonalities or relations between diﬀerent
entities. As an outcome of horizontal thinking, the inquirer can construct a
model which incorporates the new components and relations into a proce-
dural or structural assemblage, for example. Procedural models link various
events into temporally or causally connected sequences (see Musters et al.
1998: 250; European Environment Agency 1999: 9), whereas structural
models assemble several parallel factors into a common structure (e.g. Tapio
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and Willamo 2008). The key is to search for comparable systems outside the
original system of interest and then systematically detect conceptual or
causal interrelations between them. The concept of sustainable development
serves as an example of horizontal thinking: it incorporates parallel systems,
such as economic, socio-cultural and ecological, into a common frame, which
allows for an integrated analysis of previously separated entities.
In thinking vertically up, the inquirer can set out to explore, for example, a
particular environmental issue as a part of a wider system, such as environ-
mental conservation within a country or a more profound sustainability crisis.
The aim is to capture new elements of a particular issue by looking at it in the
light of a higher-level system. This enables the inquirer not only to recognize
other comparable systems, but also to focus on possible generic mechanisms
or patterns that apply to many concrete phenomena (see Zerubavel 2007).
Climate models, for example, strive for ﬁnding higher-level patterns that
emerge from the coupled dynamics of atmosphere, oceans, land surface and
sea ice.
Another aim of thinking upwards is to establish a relationship between the
constituent parts of a system and the system as a whole, and thus enable
analysis and conscious movement between the two system levels. This
involves acknowledging the dialectical relationship between knowledge and
the system within which it is constituted (Cilliers 2010; Morin 2008). Ana-
lyzing parts within the context of a whole opens up a new perspective, and
vice versa – analyzing the whole from the perspective of its constituent parts
is a useful ‘test’ of appropriateness for the way in which the given whole is
deﬁned.
3.2 Stages of outward thinking
In addition to the distinction between horizontal and vertical directions,
another pair of concepts can be used to characterize outward thinking:
the distinction between the stages of extension and integration. Extension
refers to the widening of the scope of attention by embracing either new
elements ‘neighbouring’ the original focus of attention, or a new level of
analysis that is logically ‘above’ the original level, thus enabling analysis in a
broader context. By integration we refer to the analysis of interaction between
the various components of a system, as well as between the components and
the system as a whole. This allows for emergent properties and insights to
arise.
Extension and integration are temporarily coupled in the sense that exten-
sion is the ﬁrst step of outward thinking, followed by integration of new
observations with the initial ones. During the integration, elements are blen-
ded together in order to form a new perspective or object of analysis. This
cycle can then be repeated by widening the scope of attention again into a
new direction or to a higher systemic level. The alternation of extension and
integration constitutes the core of outward thinking, and it can be carried on
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as long as there is a desire to enrich the perspective or broaden the system
under consideration. Table 2.1 presents the stages of outward thinking in
horizontally and vertically oriented thinking.
Cases of horizontal thinking, in particular, abound in the history of envir-
onmental conservation. An example is the extension of the concept of pollu-
tion in Finland and some other European countries. Pollution was ﬁrst
recognized as a problem in aquatic environments, followed by ambient air,
and ﬁnally by soil; after this gradual extension of problem framing, an inte-
grated approach to pollution prevention was adopted (Hagenah 1999: 17–18;
Laukkanen and Huutoniemi 2006). Another example of this pattern is the
development of theoretical understanding of the forest decline in Central
Europe during the 1970s and 1980s, indicated also by the changing content of
environmental textbooks. Explanations for extensive forest damages were ﬁrst
searched for by extending the analysis to cover several potential reasons one
by one. After this phase, an idea of multiple simultaneous causes was devel-
oped and soon transformed into a new framework, that of multiple stress
theory (Nuorteva 1990: 7; Willamo 2005: 139).
The dominant mode of analytical thinking, the process of demarcation and
compartmentalization, or what Morin (2008) has called ‘disjunctive thinking’
can be illustrated in the same way. In this case, the ﬁrst step is to select and
narrow down a topic of interest, followed by breaking it down into its con-
stituent parts by, for example, classiﬁcation. Thereafter the inquirer takes a
closer look at some of these categories by separating them from other things.
Also this process, that is, consecutive demarcation and compartmentalization,
can be continued until a desired level of accuracy and simplicity is reached.
For a comparison of this process and the process of outward thinking, see
Figure 2.1.
Table 2.1 Stages of outward thinking in horizontally and vertically oriented search.
Horizontal thinking Vertical thinking
Extension stage Widening the scope of
attention by searching for
other entities at the same
systemic level, either parallel
or successive to the original
object of interest
Widening the scope of
attention by searching for a
more general level of meaning
within which to situate the
original object of interest
Integration stage Integration of new entities
with the initial ones by
searching for conceptual or
causal linkages between
them
Creating a systemic account of
an issue by searching for
structured interactions it is a
part of, and the emergent
properties that arise at a higher
systemic level
Notes: Note that the cognitive operations described in the table refer to context-speciﬁc
levels and categories, not to universally valid structures.
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Both inward thinking and outward thinking are essential parts of human
knowledge production and sense-making. However, the history of environ-
mental sciences suggests that the process of narrowing and disintegration may
result from an unaware or unreﬂective selection of a viewpoint, subject matter,
or assumption in research or education, for example. Framings that are products
of historical and to some extent idiosyncratic processes are easily taken for
granted by researchers and students, who thus never question their relevance
but direct their attention accordingly. Particular meanings given to things
start to dominate thinking and action, and the conceptual grip on interactions
across institutionalized categories may be lost. Moreover, some categories are
often picked up and analyzed in further detail, while others are set aside
(Bowler 1992). This process characterizes the institutionalization of knowl-
edge, both intended and accidental, but the outcome has usually been towards
more fragmented and reiﬁed accounts of environmental problems.
4 Heuristics for systemic understanding of environmental problems
In what follows, we discuss three heuristics designed to combat the tendency
of reductionist or disjunctive thinking and facilitate more comprehensive
understanding of environmental issues through outward thinking. The
Figure 2.1 Processes of extending and integrating as well as demarcating and com-
partmentalizing (modiﬁed from Willamo 2005: Figure 10).
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heuristics help make sense of various environmental problems by detecting
their connections to the broader realm of human–environment interaction.
They suggest ‘lumping rather than splitting’ as an overall style of theorizing
(cf. Zerubavel 2007). We do not present them as ‘theories’ of environmental
problems, but as more generic tools that may be used to guide analysis of
particular environmental issues, or to inspire further investigation of their
complexity. All these heuristics have been applied to such purposes (e.g. Berninger
et al. 1996: 45–47; Lyytimäki and Tapio 2009; Manninen and Willamo 1993;
Nygrén et al. 2012; Varho et al. 2013). What is interesting here is the logic of
these heuristics, that is, the conceptual or cognitive work they do in organizing
our attention in environmental problem solving.
4.1 Search tool for human-induced environmental change
The threats of modern human activities to environmental sustainability are
numerous and interconnected. They include issues such as habitat destruction
and biodiversity loss, deforestation, degradation of the oceans, scarcity of
fresh water for a growing population, depletion of resources, toxic synthetic
chemicals accumulating in the environment, anthropogenic climate change,
etc. (Murphy 2012). If we start to make a list, it quickly becomes clear that it
is potentially endless, and any attempt to prioritization is likewise an enor-
mous task. Moreover, environmental issues do not seem to have much of a
pattern at all, but are often perceived as a miscellaneous set of undesirable
changes in the natural environment.
Frameworks that aim at systematic presentation of environmental problems
do exist. They can be used to sort out environmentally harmful human
activities, sources and types of emissions, various ecological eﬀects, and so
forth. Perhaps the most traditional scheme of describing environmental
problems is their categorization into issues pertaining to environmental degra-
dation on the one hand and to natural resources and conservation on the other
(e.g. Miller 1979: 6–12). From the viewpoint of epistemological complexity, a
shortcoming of the existing frameworks is their reliance on a ﬁxed set of
categories drawn from prevailing knowledge of environmental problems. A
further inspection of most categories reveals that they are arbitrary, and they
could also be diﬀerent. What we ﬁnd lacking in these classiﬁcations is an
explicit criterion for inclusiveness. In other words, a criterion is needed
for deciding which activities, emissions, eﬀects and so on should be included
in the environmental analysis. At the same time, major risks for the environ-
ment – such as the increase of artiﬁcial light at night (Lyytimäki and Rinne
2013) – may go unnoticed partly because they do not ﬁt into the prevailing
categories of environmental problems.
Thus, a central weakness in the concept and practice of environmental
protection is the ﬂuid understanding of what constitutes an environmental
problem in the ﬁrst place, and thereby a lack of systemic overview of the pro-
blematique. We propose that the situation could be enhanced if the underlying
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similarities between, say, the taking of gravel, chemical pollution, hunting, noc-
turnal lighting, and other nature-burdening activities were better understood.
The lack of systemic approach to human-induced changes in the environment
may result in a total unawareness of a certain type of environmental
change, such as the emissions of light or of potential or kinetic energy. For
example, little attention is paid to the way in which masses of water in
reservoirs cause strains in earth surface, and thereby their potential inﬂuence
on earthquakes (see Gupta 2002). Even when such environmental changes and
risks are recognized, they are not systematically linked to other environmental
concerns and thus easily remain unattached to the realm of environmental
protection. For example, the fact that masses of hedgehogs are killed by road
traﬃc is typically perceived as an environmental issue (e.g. Huijser and
Bergers 2000), whereas people’s death in traﬃc accidents is categorized as a
road safety issue. At the same time, the eﬀects of air pollution on all living
organisms are perceived as environmental issues. This imbalance implies that
a moving car is not recognized as a discharge of kinetic energy in the same
way as sulphur dioxide is recognized as a chemical discharge.
As a solution to this arbitrary conception of what counts as an environ-
mental problem, we propose a heuristic tool for identifying and categorizing
human-induced environmental changes. This tool uses ecological interaction
at the interface between human systems and natural systems as its starting
point, and focuses on the direct inﬂuences of the former on the latter. The idea
is that we can conceptualize all environmental problems as resulting from
either a discharge from human systems to ecological systems, or an intake
from ecological systems to human systems. ‘Discharges’ and ‘intakes’ are
anything that matter in ecological terms. This is not to say that such inﬂu-
ences are always problematic, or that all environmental problems can be
explained by these concepts, but that they provide both search heuristics and
boundary judgements for identifying potential environmental problems.
Borrowing the logic of ecosystem ecology (e.g. Odum 1971), the heuristic
tool distinguishes between four systemic levels at which humans change their
environment: (1) energy and its ﬂow, (2) abiotic matter and its circulation,
(3) living matter including its structures and functions, (4) mechanical macro-
level constructions and functions, such as soil and bedrock structures, water
systems, and the ﬂow of water and air. Human action brings on changes at
all levels, and together these changes constitute the human inﬂuence on
nature as a systemic whole. Discharges and intakes can thus be comprised of
energy (e.g. warmth, sound), matter (e.g. carbon dioxide, phosphorus), living
matter (e.g. genes, individuals of a certain species), or macro-level structures
(e.g. reservoirs, gravel ridges).
This categorization aims to cover all levels of ecological occurrence.
In systems language, these levels are distinguished from each other by an
ecologically deﬁned complexity threshold. Due to the diﬀerent nature of
events occurring on diﬀerent levels, they are not always recognized as various
forms of human-induced change in the ecological system. The ﬂow of energy
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can be grasped by physics’ concepts, the circulation of matter by chemistry
tools, and so on. One has to actively look outward from a single conceptual
framework in order to uncover the commonalities between, for instance, the
‘discharge’ of kinetic energy from a moving car and a discharge of sulphur
dioxide from an industrial plant.
This heuristic draws on classiﬁcations and models used in, for example,
textbooks about environmental conservation, but aims at a broader and
more coherent overview of the multiple ways humans inﬂuence nature. It can
be understood as an extension of the systematic analysis of material ﬂows
(Schmidt-Bleek 1993), which is based on a similar idea of inputs from geo-
and biosphere to technosphere (natural resources) on one hand and outputs
from technosphere back to geo- and biosphere (pollutants) on the other.
However, while both ‘natural resources’ and ‘pollutants’ tend to be under-
stood in traditional terms, and consisting of matter only, our heuristic scheme
is designed for detecting all kinds of ecological exchanges, including energy,
living matter and macro-level structures. This is an important contribution,
given that chemical pollutants have clearly dominated environmental
discourse over energy discharges, as exempliﬁed already by the debate raised
by Rachel Carson. An exception of this pattern is the attention paid to the
radiation caused by nuclear energy, especially related to the Chernobyl
disaster in 1986.
This heuristic categorization also serves for communication and mutual
understanding between diﬀerent practitioners who deal with environmental
aspects of economic or societal activities. It provides decision makers, envir-
onmental professionals, and scholars from diﬀerent disciplines with a scheme
for thinking outward and a common vocabulary for conceptualizing environ-
mental impacts. Similarly, various regulations on economic and societal
behaviour, such as emission limits, traﬃc speed limits, quotas for hunting, and
restrictions on planning and construction, can be seen as special means for
the general goal to control discharges to and intakes from the ecological
environment. Moreover, no domain of economic activity is exempted
from this scrutiny. The conventional categories of environmentally harmful
activities do not usually include sports, for example, even though the
environmental impacts of sports activities are not insigniﬁcant enough to be
ignored (e.g. Stoddart 2011).
The heuristic value of this scheme derives from its pursuit of overall yet
systemic understanding of environmental eﬀects. The system of interest here is
deﬁned as broadly as possible – it is the human–environment interaction – and
environmental problems are seen as a dimension of that system. The systemic
approach we propose thus goes beyond being just ‘systematic’, which refers to
procedures that follow some system or organized method. The current prac-
tice of environmental impact assessment (EIA), for example, includes a sys-
tematic analysis of environmental impacts, but given the broad variety of
systems of interest (i.e. power plants, mines, motorways, etc.), the analyses
rarely grasp environmental impacts in the systemic sense described above.
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4.2 The architecture of an environmental problem
While the above heuristic helps to piece together environmental problems as a
systemic dimension of human–environment interaction, it does not tell us
how such problems come about. However, it sets a stage for a systemic con-
sideration of that issue as well. The system of interest can be broadened so
that the ‘discharges’ and ‘intakes’ become components of another system, the
‘architecture’ of an environmental problem. The structure and components of
this wider system are described elsewhere (‘Environmental Protection Pro-
cess’, see Willamo 2005; Tapio and Willamo 2008); here we discuss it as a
heuristic tool for understanding what constitutes an environmental problem.
While the actual procedure leading to the emergence of any particular
problem is unique and too complex to lend itself to any single model, all
problems can be treated as special cases of a generic pattern.
The pursuit of comprehensive understanding of environmental problem
solving is not new. Process models for describing human–environment inter-
action with a view to tackling environmental problems have been developed in
environmental sciences and management, and they are widely used in envir-
onmental policy and administration. Perhaps the most widely used is the
Pressures-State-Response (PSR) framework, developed by the Organisation
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in the 1980s. Accord-
ing to the framework, human activities cause ‘pressure’ on the environment,
which inﬂuences the ‘state’ of the environment, and the deterioration of the
environment then triggers ‘responses’ in society. The framework has been
further developed by the European Environment Agency in the 1990s and
2000s, and its more recent version (DPSIR) distinguishes between ‘pressures’
and ‘drivers’ for them, as well as between the ‘state’ of the environment and
the ‘impacts’ of this change. These frameworks have been important tools
for comprehensive assessment and management of environmental issues
(e.g. European Environment Agency 2003; Svarstad et al. 2007).
Like these frameworks, our heuristic connects environmental problems and
their solutions to the interactions between the human (or societal) and envir-
onmental (or natural) systems. However, we make this distinction for heuristic
purposes only, not to assume an ontological diﬀerence. Human society is an
emergent construction of natural evolution, and is thus embedded in nature.
However, due to their emergent properties, human systems follow diﬀerent
regularities than the rest of nature. While ‘human system’ and ‘ecological
system’ are inseparable in the ontological sense, we argue that their con-
ceptual distinction is helpful for making sense of how environmental pro-
blems come about. What deﬁnes these problems is their association with
ecological exchange between human systems and ecological systems (see Section
4.1), and the various feedback mechanisms between the two systems.
It is exactly these interactions that the PSR and DPSIR frameworks aim to
describe. However, as they do not problematize the nature of those interac-
tions, they fail to recognize many contingent factors of environmental
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problems. For example, ‘drivers’ typically refer to industry, transport, agri-
culture, along with others, without addressing the underlying social and cul-
tural structures in which they are embedded. Similarly, environmental
changes are not distinguished from environmental problems, as if the latter
followed directly from the former. In order to grasp the complexity of envir-
onmental problems, it is helpful to include the main sources of contingency
into the framework that is used to describe them. Contingencies originate
from the dynamics of both human and ecological systems as well as the way
in which they interact. This implies that there is no pre-determined relation-
ship between the components of environmental problems, but each problem
can be characterized as a complex system.
Figure 2.2 presents our heuristic model for mapping what constitutes an
environmental problem. As a heuristic for systemic understanding, it has two
deﬁning characteristics. First, it presents the major components of an envir-
onmental problem as a complex system, while aspiring for simplicity or ‘thin
description’ (Brekhus et al. 2005). The model applies to many diﬀerent set-
tings, as far as the system of interest is a human-induced environmental
change. Second, it takes account of the diﬀerent dynamics of both human and
ecological systems, and treats them as a duality. While not denying the central





Action Discharge/Intake                 Change  





Figure 2.2 The architecture of an environmental problem (modiﬁed from Willamo
2005: Figure 21; Tapio and Willamo 2008: Figure 4).
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approach can be set against a version of social constructivism that reduces
nature to discourse about it and obscures the eﬀects of the autonomous
dynamics of nature (see Murphy 2007). In contrast to the latter view, we are
interested in social constructions as important feedback links between human
systems and ecological systems. The way ecological changes are perceived and
dealt with depends on human systems, but these humanly constructed
meanings themselves can be understood as having causal powers in humans’
inﬂuence on ecological systems.
Due to its generalizability, the model serves as a checklist for analyzing the
emergence and possible resolution of any environmental problem as a sys-
temic whole. By applying this model it is possible to identify elements and
stages in the process that easily go unrecognized (e.g. Nygrén et al. 2012;
Varho et al. 2013). In this sense, it provides a descriptive heuristic that allows
one to make interconnections between a broader range and diversity of vari-
ables. It portrays both the ‘autonomous’ dynamics of nature and human-
induced changes in parallel, without assuming a dichotomy between them. At
the same time, it distinguishes between environmental change as an ecological
process occurring according to the natural laws on one hand and environ-
mental problem as a socially deﬁned phenomenon on the other hand – as well
as the connection between them.
4.3 Heuristic list of interconnections involved in environmental issues
The two heuristic models described above help understand environmental
issues in a systemic manner: the ﬁrst model lays out human-induced envir-
onmental changes as a whole, and the second unpacks the structure of an
environmental problem as a complex process. In addition to these ‘variables’,
the complexity of environmental problems involves many other aspects. For
example, environmental changes involve multiple causes and eﬀects, with
sometimes notable time lags, tipping points, and other nonlinear relationships
included. They also tend to cross geographical, disciplinary, bureaucratic
and other institutional boundaries, and intertwine with one another and
with other societal problems. Moreover, they are frequently perceived as pro-
blematic for many diﬀerent reasons. And the list of complex properties goes
on. Table 2.2 presents a catalogue of measures or dimensions according to
which environmental issues involve multiple perspectives and their inter-
connections. The table also suggests requirements for how to approach those
complexities.
The table serves as a heuristic checklist of aspects or variables of environ-
mental issues that can be successfully captured through outward thinking. In
the beginning of an inquiry, it prevents premature closure of consideration or
drift into a too narrow track of reasoning (cf. Abbott 2004). At a later stage,
it helps connect the selected focus with other related issues and concerns.
Checking the aspects listed in the table should open up possibilities to enrich
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environmental analysis, whether for a strictly deﬁned purpose or for a more
open-ended inquiry.
For example, the ‘time’ factor can lead an Environmental Impact Analyst
of a building project to think about the previous uses of the building site, the
likely lifespan of the building, and the future of the site thereafter. It also
reminds us of the cultural and social contexts of time (see Banister, Chapter 4,
this volume). Similarly, the ‘space’ factor helps an analyst to observe
both direct and indirect environmental eﬀects. A certain amount of direct
environmental eﬀects (e.g. sound, waste) arises in the spatial proximity of
a given target of analysis, whereas indirect eﬀects occur beyond it. The latter
include, for example, the eﬀects caused by the production and transportation
of energy, food, construction materials and other goods consumed in the
target site.
The ‘societal activities, actors and structures’ dimension reminds an
environmental analyst of the underlying connections between various social
realities. In preparing for, say, a national report of the state of the environment,
or environmental activities of an organization, one can get an idea of merging
items that are usually treated on a sectoral basis. For example, human-
induced noise is perceived, depending on context, either as an environmental
issue or an occupational health issue. In many situations, it would make sense
to combine these categories instead of reporting them separately – at least
when they refer to the same sound.
The ‘environmental problems’ dimension refers to the typical classiﬁcation
between climate change, biodiversity loss, resource depletion, chemical accu-
mulation and so forth. An environmental instructor, for instance, is reminded
by this item to address connections between environmental problems right at
the basic level, instead of scheduling one class on climate change, another on
biodiversity loss, and so on. Students’ cognitive conceptualization can be
notably supported by considering links between problems (Willamo 2005: 74).
An example of a systemic representation is that acidiﬁcation primarily strains
topographically high areas, which tend to be arid due to the weathering eﬀect
of water, whereas eutrophication causes problems in river valleys and lowlands,
which are naturally rich in nutrients and in which human activity is also
otherwise intensive. Besides noting that both phenomena have to do with,
for example, nitrogen emissions, this linkage facilitates students’ holistic
understanding of the way human inﬂuence on the environment intertwines
with the ‘autonomous’ dynamics of nature.
The history of environmental conservation is full of cases where this type of
heuristic would have been useful. A canonical example is that the elements of
ecological environment – air, water and soil – were perceived too strongly as
three separate objects of protection. In Finland, which is rich in lakes,
awareness of water pollution arose early and the Water Pollution Control Act
came into eﬀect as early as 1962. Air Pollution Control Act did not take eﬀect
until 1982, but soil was at the time not yet properly considered as an object to
be protected from pollution. Speciﬁc law for soil pollution control was never
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enacted but statutes concerning soil were later incorporated into diﬀerent
laws. This time lag in the ‘discovery’ of soil as an object of conservation still
has repercussions on Finnish environmental protection.
‘Hierarchical levels’ arrange related items vertically, but sometimes the
links between diﬀerent levels are lost. For example, in the Convention on
Biological Diversity, founded at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992,
biological diversity was deﬁned broadly as ‘variability among living organisms
from all sources including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic
ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they are part’ (UN 1992: 3).
Later on, however, biodiversity has come to be understood to cover only three
hierarchical levels: 1) genetic, 2) species, and 3) ecosystem diversity. This
classiﬁcation is widely established in the discussion on biodiversity (e.g. Miller
1996: 26; UNEP 2013). However, biological diversity manifests also on
other levels, including the level of individual organisms. Each individual is
diﬀerent from one another, not only in their biological inheritance but also in
their life history adaptations, and thus contributes to biological diversity.
Inattention to individuals in conceptions of biodiversity has left discussion on
animal rights in a dubious position. As the diversity of individuals is
not counted as part of biodiversity, advocating animal rights is not always
perceived as ‘proper’ environmentalism, even though the topic is important in
environmental philosophy (e.g. Singer 1975; Taylor 1981).
Perhaps the most important dimension of Table 2.2 is the last item, ‘aspects
of human existence’: despite the ‘human’ side of this existence, a human being
is subordinate to the dynamics and exigencies of nature. Nevertheless, the
mental and the bodily dimensions of our relationship to nature are often
perceived and presented separately in research and education (see Woodgate
and Redclift 1998). In the concepts of environmental education, for example,
one’s ‘relationship to nature’ often refers exclusively to one’s mental con-
structs of nature; one’s bodily functions, in turn, are solely biological matters
that are not incorporated into the concept. Individual human beings are
thus portrayed to have a relationship to nature with their knowledge, values
and emotions, but without their metabolism, need of oxygen, immune system
and so on. This is an absurd consequence of disjunctive thinking.
Overall, these kinds of considerations open up complexities involved in
environmental issues due to their coupled relationship with many diﬀerent
systems. In a single inquiry, it is nonetheless important to focus on one or few
dimensions and to avoid mixing them up; otherwise, there is an obvious risk
of expanding the analysis too much or losing attention.
5 Conclusions
The complexity of environmental problems suggests searching for solutions
at a systemic level. Due to the nature of human-ecological systems as open
systems consisting of many parts that interact in an intricate manner,
improving one component of a system may lead to further problems
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elsewhere. Any such solution appears partial and unsatisfactory when seen
from a higher systemic level. As correctly judged by Ulrich (1994: 35), ‘the
implication of the systems idea is not that we must understand the whole
system, but rather that we critically deal with the fact that we never do’.
According to Preiser and Cilliers (2010), this attitude provides us with the
methodological basis for developing tools of critical reﬂection.
In this chapter, we have discussed a cognitive strategy and heuristics
for dealing with the complexity of environmental issues. Our primary goal
has been to contribute to environmental analysts’ general ability to recognize
emergent properties and patterns of human-environmental interaction,
construed from the overall perspective of environmental problematique. We
have not so much been concerned with theorizing about this interaction
as with facilitating systemic understanding and problem solving in
diﬀerent environmental settings. Complexity emerges in context-speciﬁc
ways, but analogical reasoning and abstraction allows for comparing similar
events, activities, or phenomena despite their situational variation (cf.
Zerubavel 2007). What is appropriate and purposeful in one situation can
be informed by other related situations, even if the situations cannot be
treated as ‘cases’ of a similar kind or a general rule due to the emergent
properties involved. Holistic understanding of a particular case is not trans-
ferable in any unequivocal sense, but may inform pattern recognition
across cases.
While pattern-matching ability is a form of tacit knowledge that indicates
the highest level of mastering a skill (Flyvbjerg 2001), we have suggested
relatively simple heuristics that may guide the search for patterns amongst the
complexity of environmental issues. We have discussed a cognitive strategy
through which individuals, organizations, or other observers can consciously
move outwards from their initial object of interest and thereby construct a
new understanding of the situation from a broader scope. This may trigger
changes in the underlying categories of thought and action and lead to a
more holistic conceptualization of the situation. The ultimate aim of this
strategy is to create cognitive conditions in which systemic understandings
can emerge. Responsible conceptualization of problems requires awareness of
other alternative framings, and a selection of one that is relevant for the task
at hand (McClintock et al. 2003).
There is a bunch of evidence in environmental history that shows the
need for the kind of outward thinking we have proposed in this chapter.
For example, the various ways in which humans alter energy ﬂows
have received surprisingly little attention in modern environmental thinking
compared to chemical pollution (see e.g. Miller 1979; Cunningham and
Saigo 1992; Chiras 2001). This is understandable given the dramatic impacts
of chemicals on ecosystems and human health, but indicates a failure of
systemic attention to human interference in the dynamics of nature. Recent
discussion on energy emissions has brought a lot of new knowledge of the
eﬀects of lighting, noise, electromagnetic ﬁelds and so on, which would
44 Katri Huutoniemi and Risto Willamo
Template: Royal A, Font: ,
Date: 04/02/2014; 3B2 version: 9.1.406/W Unicode (May 24 2007) (APS_OT)
Dir: //integrafs1/kcg/2-Pagination/TandF/TSS_RAPS/3b2/9780415855792.3d
have been possible to anticipate on the basis of the experience with chemical
emissions.
Problems with pigeonholing are not limited to scientiﬁc understanding,
but strongly inﬂuence practice. Our example of the exclusion of sports from
the sphere of environmental regulation indicates that economic activities may
end up in unequal positions due to the lack of systemic attention to environ-
mental eﬀects – neither objective assessment nor public deliberation is being
conducted to exempt sports from environmental control. In general, the
inclusion and exclusion of items in existing categories have long-term
political and ethical implications (Bowker and Star 1999; Connolly 2002;
Haraway 1985).
We have illustrated three heuristics for grasping environmental problems
as systemic outcomes of human–environment interaction, or as ‘mismatches’
between the dynamics of human systems and the dynamics of nature.
These are heuristics in the aforementioned sense: they aim at facilitating
environmental understanding and problem solving in particular situations in
a way that allows for alignment and comparison across situations and
thereby for a more systemic comprehension and treatment of environmental
issues.
Besides being tools for systemic understanding and problem solving, the
three heuristics are also products of the cognitive strategy of outward think-
ing. The ﬁrst one, search tool for human-induced environmental change, as
well as the third one that sums up interconnections involved in environmental
issues, are examples of new classiﬁcation schemes created by outward think-
ing. The second heuristic, the architecture of an environmental problem, is a
product of a more focused attempt to extend and integrate the analytic
dimensions of previous process models through horizontal thinking.
The most obvious functions of the proposed heuristics are their usage as
checklists on the one hand and as challengers of existing boundaries on the
other hand. As checklists, they provide comprehensive categories or topics
that relate to the object of interest – types of direct environmental eﬀects of
human activity in the ﬁrst case; structural components of an environmental
problem in the second case; and a list of interconnections involved in envir-
onmental issues in the third case. A special strength of the ﬁrst heuristic is
its theoretical coverage of all types of human-induced direct ecological
eﬀect (discharges and intakes), whereas the second heuristic is generalizable to
any human-induced environmental change. Both heuristics can thus function
as wide-ranging and strong checklists that facilitate systemic attention to
human–environment interaction from their respective points of observation.
As challengers of existing boundaries in environmental thinking, all three
heuristics illustrate systemic links between things that are frequently
sorted out from each other. Overall, the heuristics ensure that institutiona-
lized categories and forms of analysis are not mechanically applied in sus-
tainability problem solving, which clearly requires entirely new ways of
thought and action.
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